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Abstract
Introduction: Numerous sub-Saharan African countries have experimented with performance-based financing (PBF)
with the goal of improving health system performance. To date, few articles have examined the implementation of
this type of complex intervention in Francophone West Africa. This qualitative research aims to understand the
process of implementing a PBF pilot project in Mali's Koulikoro region.
Method: We conducted a contrasted multiple case study of performance in 12 community health centres in three
districts. We collected 161 semi-structured interviews, 69 informal interviews and 96 non-participant observation
sessions. Data collection and analysis were guided by the Consolidated Framework for Implementation Research
adapted to the research topic and local context.
Results: Our analysis revealed that the internal context of the PBF implementation played a key role in the process.
High-performing centres exercised leadership and commitment more strongly than low-performing ones. These
two characteristics were associated with taking initiatives to promote PBF implementation and strengthening team
spirit. Information regarding the intervention was best appropriated by qualified health professionals. However, the
limited duration of the implementation did not allow for the emergence of networks or champions. The
enthusiasm initially generated by PBF quickly dissipated, mainly due to delays in the implementation schedule and
the payment modalities.
Conclusion: PBF is a complex intervention in which many actors intervene in diverse contexts. The initial level of
performance and the internal and external contexts of primary healthcare facilities influence the implementation of
PBF. Future work in this area would benefit from an interdisciplinary approach combining public health and
anthropology to better understand such an intervention. The deductive–inductive approach must be the stepping-
stone of such a methodological approach.
Keywords: Implementation, PBF, Mali, CFIR, complex intervention
Background
Over the past 15 years, performance-based financing
(PBF) has attracted attention as a means of achieving
specific health objectives more effectively in low-income
countries and fragile states [1]. In summarising PBF in
both its broadest sense and in the narrow view focused
solely on financial incentives, Renmans et al. [2] offer
the following definition of PBF-type interventions: “per-
formance-based financing is a supply-side reform package
that is guided towards improved performance (defined a
increased predefined services and improved quality mea-
sures) by using performance-based financial incentives
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for health providers (facilities and/or workers)”. Accord-
ing to this definition, positive performance can be en-
couraged by linking payments to desired outcomes and
by fostering decision-making autonomy and entrepre-
neurial behaviour at the health facility level [3].
Thirty-two (out of a total of 46) sub-Saharan African
countries have tried PBF with the objective of reforming
their health system [4]. This intervention is often pro-
moted with the support of certain international actors,
in particular the World Bank. Some studies suggest that
PBF has had a positive influence on the overall perform-
ance of health facilities, particularly on services use [5–
7]. Yet, after many experiments, PBF remains controver-
sial in the research community, notably because of dis-
crepancies between the funding allocated and the results
obtained [8–10]. Scientific evidence of its effectiveness
and efficiency remains limited [11, 12]. In particular, it is
criticised for its potential perverse effects, including the
fact that it may, in fact, weaken the health system [8]
and have unintended effects [13].
The reasons for PBF implementation in Mali were di-
verse, but the initiative mainly sought to improve health
indicators, the management and motivation of health-
care personnel, and access to care [14]. The expansion
of PBF is one of the strategic priorities of the Health and
Social Development Program 2014–2018 [15]. The PBF
project in Mali discussed in this article was funded by
the World Bank as part of a larger initiative to
strengthen reproductive health. It was implemented in
the 10 health districts (HDs) of the Koulikoro region be-
tween July 2016 and February 2017. We refer to it here
as the ‘second pilot project’; as it followed the imple-
mentation of an earlier project in three HDs in this re-
gion between 2012 and 2013. This first project
was supported by the Koninklijk Instituut voor de Tropen
(Royal Tropical Institute) and the Dutch development
agency Stichting Nederlandse Vrijwilligers (we refer to
this as the ‘first pilot project’). The designers of the first
pilot project called it the ‘pre-pilot’. This project was
intended to give concrete expression to the notion of a
“PBF à la malienne” based on local specificities [16]. A
study reported elsewhere highlighted the low level of
sustainability of this first project due to, among other
things, a lack of sustainability planning [17].
While some research has been conducted on PBF im-
plementation on the African continent [9, 18, 19], stud-
ies on the subject are still limited in francophone Africa
[20]. The PBF literature remains largely dominated by
impact assessments. While these assessments are useful
to better understand the effects of PBF on health worker
motivation and on health, they do not clearly explain
how these effects are produced [3] nor the contexts in
which they occur. Some research has shown that analys-
ing the PBF implementation process provides a better
understanding of the outcomes achieved [21]. Recent
studies have paid more attention to the impacts of PBF
on the relationships among actors in the health system
and to the contexts and processes that explain whether
or not these outcomes are achieved [18, 22–26]. To
understand the processes, the contextual characteristics
of implementation are essential elements and warrant
in-depth analysis [27]. Through this article we aim to
help understand the implementation process in commu-
nity health centres through the use of a qualitative mul-
tiple case study approach and of an innovative
conceptual framework – the Consolidated Framework
for Implementation Research (CFIR).
The research question is the following: How is PBF is
implemented and adapted to the socio-political, health
and institutional contexts? Our study setting is charac-
terised by multiple features, i.e. health decentralisation
(whereby local actors play a leading role), insufficient
qualified personnel, low utilisation of services, insuffi-
cient access to quality services, poor performance evalu-
ation, and inadequate infrastructure and equipment [28].
In rural areas, the use of family planning services is in-
fluenced by male objection according to widespread so-
cial norms [29]. One of the three districts selected for
data collection participated in a previous PBF project
while the other two were utilising it for the first time.
Several years before PBF, a previous intervention in the
Koulikoro region had implemented an accreditation sys-
tem with bonuses for the most efficient health centres.
Using an innovative, all-encompassing conceptual frame-
work (i.e. the CFIR, see details below), our qualitative re-
search explains how the contextual specificities of the
health centres influence the quality of the implementa-
tion of PBF by emphasising what makes PBF work in
some health centres and not in others. It also highlights
the legacy of local history and how the latter might in-
fluence implementation processes, thereby reflecting the
idea that the past represents a stepping-stone for imple-
menting policies and techniques and securing imple-
mentation success [30]. In addition, very few scholars
have applied the CFIR to understand the implementa-
tion of PBF pilot projects in African countries, particu-
larly in community health centres; our study thus offers
to fill this gap. Our findings will be useful for researchers
and decision-makers in the current context of the re-
deployment of PBF in Mali.
Research methodology
Conceptual framework
The term ‘implementation’ refers to one or more pro-
cesses organised in a particular context to help achieve
the changes intended by an intervention through the
means being deployed [31]. Many theories and concep-
tual frameworks exist to understand the implementation
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of interventions. For this study, we chose to use the
CFIR, which consolidates key constructs of implementa-
tion theories. It was proposed by Damschroder et al.
[32] to help assess how effective the implementation of
an intervention is in a specific context. The CFIR has
proven useful in a wide range of scenarios, including
low-income contexts [33]. We chose the CFIR for two
reasons. First, it is easy to apply because of its adaptabil-
ity to the context and research question. Second, it is
one of the few tools that can provide a comprehensive
view of the intervention within a logically coherent
framework.
According to the CFIR, to understand an interven-
tion’s implementation, five ‘domains’ must be studied,
namely (1) the characteristics of the intervention; (2) the
external context of health facilities; (3) the internal con-
text of health facilities; (4) the characteristics of individ-
uals; and (5) the implementation process. The CFIR
consists of 39 constructs and sub-constructs divided
among these five domains. The research design we
adopted was that of a contrasted multiple case study
with several embedded levels of analysis [34]. The cases
were community health centres (Centre de santé com-
munautaire; CSCOMs), i.e. primary care centres. Data
were collected between December 2016 and January
2017 in three of the 10 HDs in the Koulikoro region –
HD1, HD2 and HD3. The three HDs were selected on
the basis of specific criteria, namely an agricultural site
that had experienced being involved in a cash transfer
programme for the poorest; a site where it was planned
to test a communal mutual insurance program; and a
site with an urban character. Of the three HDs selected,
only one (HD1) had taken part in the first PBF pilot pro-
ject in 2012–2013.
Since we were not able to conduct our study in all
CSCOMs due to budget and time constraints, we se-
lected four CSCOMs per HD, two from among the
highest-performing (CSCOMs '++' and CSCOMs '+' ac-
cording to performance level) and two from the lowest-
performing (CSCOMs '- -' and CSCOMs '-' according to
performance level), for a total of 12 CSCOMs within the
three HDs [35] (Table 1). The CSCOMs’ performance
level was defined on the basis of qualitative and quanti-
tative criteria that emerged from a participatory and
consensual process involving the reference health centre
(CSREF) teams and a research team composed of the
principal investigator (AC) and a doctoral student to
support study preparation and to participate in the selec-
tion of study sites in view of collecting data for her thesis
[35]. For researchers, this offered a timely opportunity to
test a model of participatory case selection [36]. This is
an innovative approach that makes it possible to legitim-
ise the criteria for site selection beforehand, in particu-
lar, the notion of performance by taking into account
the health workers’ perspective. The highest-performing
CSCOMs were often associated with better involvement
of community leaders in activities, greater community
mobilisation, greater demographic density, better in-
volvement of the Community Health Association (Asso-
ciation de santé Communautaire; ASACO) in activities,
dynamic health care personnel, etc. Compared to other
CSCOMs, the HD1 CSCOMs had the advantage of
benefiting from some of the infrastructure put in place
during the first PBF project.
The four CSCOMs selected in each health district
were composed of one urban CSCOM (CSCOM of the
district capital) and three rural CSCOMs, with the ex-
ception of the Koulikoro HD where there are two urban
CSCOMs. Some common characteristics were noted.
They relate to the type of the infrastructure (generally
including a consultation room, a delivery room, a nurs-
ing and a hospitalisation room), the profile of the
personnel (most often composed of the technical dir-
ector of the centre (TDC), nurses, midwives, birth atten-
dants, nurses’ aides, vaccinators, drug depot manager
and a hygienist).
The criteria for the inclusion of CSCOMs in the study
were defined as follows: have a community health centre
status, located in one of the three HDs selected for this
study, and be among the CSCOMs classified either as
most efficient or less efficient by the end of the selection
process. The exclusion criteria were as follows: any
CSCOM not located in one of the three HDs selected
for this study and any CSCOM not selected by the end
of the selection process.
Description of the intervention
The second PBF pilot project involved a certain number
of institutional actors and functions (Table 2).
At the local level, PBF was implemented in CSCOMs
and CSREFs. The quantitative and qualitative results of
these providers are evaluated by the HD management
team for the CSCOM level and the Regional Health De-
partment for the CSREF level. Once evaluated, results
are purchased by the local authorities, which are in-
volved in signing performance contracts with the pro-
viders (town hall for the CSCOM and circle council for
CSREF). The regulatory function (i.e. checking whether
Table 1 Number and level of performance of Centres de santé
communautaire (community health centres; CSCOMs) by health
district (HD)
HD CSCOM++ CSCOM+ CSCOM- - CSCOM - Total
HD1 1 1 1 1 4
HD2 1 1 1 1 4
HD3 1 1 1 1 4
Total 3 3 3 3 12
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norms and standards are respected) is carried out by the
Regional Health Department for the CSREFs and the
HD management team for the CSCOM. The funds used
to purchase the results are mobilised by the Project Co-
ordination Unit/Strengthening Reproductive Health Pro-
ject (SRHP). A counter-check is carried out by an
independent agency to find out whether patients actually
received the health services and their level of
satisfaction.
As in any PBF intervention, health facilities are
funded based on the purchase of quantity indicators
(Table 3) and quality indicators (Table 4). Ten quan-
titative indicators reflecting major maternal and child
health issues were selected for the pilot project in ac-
cordance with the priority topics of the World Bank’s
SRHP. In addition, three quality domains correspond-
ing to specific scores were covered, namely resources
and processes (30%), clinical quality (50%) and user
satisfaction (20%).
Typically, quantity indicators are purchased at a fixed
price, whereas the payment for quality indicators de-
pends on achieving a minimum target. In the case at
hand, after an audit identified any discrepancy between
the figures reported by the CSCOMs and the actual
provision of services as well as by assessing users’ satis-
faction level and verifying the health workers’
Table 2 Functions and tasks of institutional actors involved in performance-based financing implementation
Institutions Functions Tasks
✓ CSCOM Service provision - Propose and execute the results plan
✓ CSREF - Negotiate and sign the contract
- Produce the services and care
✓ For CSCOMs: Commune and ASACO (pays for the
technical services)
Purchasing (contracting) - Define priorities
- Negotiate the results plan
✓ For CSREFs: Circle Council - Negotiate and sign the contract
- Launch the audit process
- Purchase the outputs
✓ Project coordination unit/Strengthening
Reproductive Health Project
Payment (for outputs produced) - Pay, after purchaser has signed
- Ensure availability of funds
✓ HDMT/RHD Regulation - Ensure norms and standards are respected – national policy
- Coach health providers
✓ For CSCOMs: HDMT Performance auditing of providers
(quantity and quality)
- Audit the veracity and reliability of the numbers reported in
health centre registers
✓ For CSREFs: RHD
- Monitor technical quality
- Submit a timely audit report to the purchaser
✓ Grassroots community organisation and
independent external agency
Cross-auditing of performance at the user
level
- Sign a contract with the purchaser
- Verify whether each person actually received the services
- Submit a timely audit report to the purchaser
✓ External auditor Annual external auditing - Verify the accuracy of the data and expenditures
✓ District management council Steering committee - Define programme policies and strategies
✓ National steering committee - Ex-post monitoring
- Arbitration in cases of differences of opinions between providers
and payers or auditors
✓ Consultancy firm Technical support
ASACO Association de santé communautaire (community health association), CSCOM Community health centre, CSREF reference health centre, HDMT Health
district management team, RHD Regional Health Department
Table 3 Quantity indicators selected for the performance-based financing pilot scheme in Koulikoro
Indicators Purchase price (Francs CFA)
Prenatal consultation (PNC 4) 3968
Delivery assisted by a qualified professional 1984
Postnatal consultation 661
Use of modern contraception by a woman 2645
Appropriate management of a malaria case in a pregnant woman 1323
Antiretroviral treatment for a pregnant woman (tested HIV positive) 2976
Complete vaccination of a child under 12 months 397
Consultation for a child under 5 years in compliance with integrated management of childhood illness 397
Appropriate management of a malaria case in a child under 5 years 198
Directly observed treatment management of a case of uncomplicated tuberculosis 2645
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quantitative results, an invoice was drawn up and sent
via a web portal to a payment agency, which then made
the transfer to each CSCOM’s account.
Data collection tools
Semi-structured interview guides were developed for
each category of individual actors interviewed. These
various actors included CSCOM personnel, ASACO
members (i.e. members of community health associa-
tions responsible for managing the CSCOM on behalf of
the community), community health workers (i.e. com-
munity members who assist qualified health workers
mainly through disease prevention and treatment activ-
ities within the community), and community leaders
who have the power to influence public opinion and
members from the commune (local elected officials).
The guides were translated from French into the Bam-
bara language and were then pre-tested. An observation
grid was also used. These various guides were developed
considering the five domains of the CFIR. Discussions
were held beforehand among the co-authors of the art-
icle (VR, LG, TZ and VR) to reach a common under-
standing of the different constructs and sub-constructs.
Techniques for data collection and sampling
Formal and informal interviews
Applying a purposive selection sampling strategy, data
were collected from different individual actors involved
in PBF implementation in the CSCOMs.
We hired research assistants (n = 3) to collect the data.
The first author (AC) trained them to use the interview
guides. At the start of data collection, AC also provided
‘formative supervision’ by monitoring some interviews
conducted by the assistants or by conducting some in-
terviews in their presence. In total, we conducted 161
formal interviews (Table 5) and 69 informal interviews
(Table 6) in the three HDs based on the respondent
profiles. This informal approach was adopted so the in-
terviewers could collect “confidences and gossip” that
would have been difficult to access otherwise.
Data was collected from these respondents based on
their availability [37] and presumed ability to shed light
on the situation under study.
CSCOM personnel are often limited in number (five
to six staff members). In most cases (10/12), all CSCOM
personnel were interviewed. In large CSCOMs and other
organisations involved in PBF implementation, we chose
to interview the people in charge of or overseeing health
activities. By including all these actors, we made sure to
consider the diversity of the different actors involved in
the implementation of PBF. As the study population was
approximately the same size in all districts, we chose a
similar sample in each of the three HDs included in the
study (69 respondents for the three HDs).
We reached saturation with the total number of in-
terviews conducted in the three HDs. Our deductive
approach is based on the application of predeter-
mined codes to the data and, in such an approach,
saturation refers to the extent to which predeter-
mined codes or themes are adequately represented in
the data [38].
Among CSCOM personnel, the illiterate or least edu-
cated are often healthcare assistants or hygienists. We
have taken into account the influence of this reality on
certain facts, particularly the level of information on
PBF, i.e. by comparing this category of staff’s perceptions
to those of respondents with higher levels of education,
such as nurses, TDCs, depot managers.
At the level of each CSCOM, the first interview was
typically conducted with the TDC, who then introduced
us to the other actors (health workers, ASACO mem-
bers, etc.). Research assistants used a recorder to record
the interviews as well as personal notebooks to record
their own reflections along with data collection. Informal
Table 4 Quality indicators by category selected for the PBF pilot scheme in Koulikoro
Category Content Weight in calculation of subsidies (value attributed
to each category of qualitative indicators)
Resources and processes - Human resources 30%
- Infrastructures
- Interactions with patients
- Hygiene
- Governance
- Role of the ASACO
Indicators of clinical quality - Availability of essential drugs 50%
- Maternal and neonatal services
- Cold chain
Users’ satisfaction 20%
ASACO Association de santé communautaire (community health association)
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interviews were most often conducted outside the
CSCOM, either at the respondent’s house or in another
place chosen by the respondent.
Observations
Non-participant observations were conducted in the
CSCOMs to study interactions between service providers
and patients during medical consultations as well as
changes made at the managerial level since the launch of
the PBF activities (hygiene of premises, data recording
procedures). The observation results were recorded in a
logbook. The investigators conducted 96 observation
sessions for the 12 CSCOMs (HD1 = 32, HD2 = 32, HD
3 = 32), i.e. an average of 8 observations per CSCOM.
We considered that this amount of observation sessions
were sufficient to reach saturation and address key
topics of interest, namely hygiene, the way in which the
tools used by the personnel were filled, etc.
Data coding and analysis process
The researchers classified all interviews conducted
and observation notes according to HDs and
CSCOMs. All formal interviews, conducted in Bam-
bara, were audio-recorded and then fully transcribed
directly into French. Translations from Bambara to
French and from French to English were performed
by the first and second authors and were further
polished by professional translators. The entire data-
set (transcripts and notes) was subsequently coded
using QDA Miner Lite software. The researchers
familiarised themselves with this software beforehand
in a 3-day training workshop led by LG. For coding
and data analysis, we adopted a deductive–inductive
thematic analysis using the CFIR domains, constructs
and sub-constructs. These CFIR dimensions guided
the definition of the initial codes, subcategories and
themes. Coding was performed by two research as-
sistants trained and guided by the first author (AC).
Of these two coders, only one took part in the data
collection. A coding tree was developed by AC and
validated by all the co-authors of the article. The
code tree presented the five CFIR domains as general
themes while allowing for the inclusion of other themes
suggested by the data. An additional file shows this in
more detail (see Additional file 1). An interpretive the-
matic analysis was then applied. Reporting of the findings
was entirely guided by the CFIR five domains. We also
provided a summary of key findings highlighting critical
inter-case comparisons.
At the time of data collection, most of the
CSCOMs had started the PBF implementation just 3
or 4 months earlier. As such, it was difficult for the
workers to perform certain activities that required
more time to become apparent. The following con-
structs and sub-constructs were not informed by our
data: ‘reflection and evaluation’, ‘opinion leaders’, ‘in-
ternal leaders formally appointed for implementation’,
‘champions’, ‘evolution’. All these constructs and sub-
constructs belong to domain 5 (‘process’) of the CFIR.
Although these excluded constructs and sub-
constructs are certainly important to describe the im-
plementation process, we were unable to use them
due to insufficient empirical data. These sub-
constructs were especially related to the theme of
stakeholders’ involvement. In making sure that we
would still report findings related to this theme, we
focused our attention on other forms of actors’ in-
volvement that could be informed by the data, in
Table 5 Distribution of respondents by category and health district, semi-structured interviews
Health
districts













HD1 4 22 8 8 10 4 56
HD2 4 18 8 8 8 4 50
HD3 4 22 7 10 9 3 55
Total 12 62 23 26 27 11 161
ASACO Association de santé communautaire (community health association), CSCOM Community health centre, HD health district
Table 6 Distribution of respondents by category and health district, informal interviews
Health districts CSCOM personnel Community workers Members from the commune ASACO members Total
HD1 8 8 2 5 23
HD2 8 8 2 5 23
HD3 8 8 2 5 23
Total 24 24 6 15 69
ASACO Association de santé communautaire (community health association), CSCOM Community health centre, HD health district
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particular the strategies used to encourage the in-
volvement of various actors or to promote their com-
mitment. Further rationale for excluding these
constructs and subconstructs is provided in Appendix
in Table 9.
Ethical considerations
Measures were taken to protect respondents from the
potential risks associated with their participation in the
study. Every precaution shall be taken to ensure that in-
formation concerning them is not divulged, including
anonymising of audio recordings and transcripts. Re-
spondents were informed that they could decline to an-
swer certain questions and that they had the right to
withdraw from the study when they wished.
Results
This section is structured as follows: we start with
reporting our results following the five CFIR domains,
then we offer a summary of inter-case comparisons.
Characteristics of the intervention
Most respondents (n = 117/161) stressed the exogenous
origin of the intervention, most often referring to its
source of funding. Only the HD1 workers, who had prior
experience with PBF, had a more positive perception of
it. The results were considered to be proof in
themselves:
“When we look at the results, we can see there really
have been changes, especially in the indicators. It’s a
CSCOM that’s under-used.” (TDC, HD1)
The reasons for the positive view of the first pilot pro-
ject, which at the same time entailed a negative view of
the second, had to do with the creation of infrastruc-
tures. For most respondents (n = 106/161), they were
also related to subsidy amounts and the choice of indica-
tors considered more advantageous:
“[In the] first [project], delivery was paid at 1000 F
for birth attendants and 3000 F for nurse-
obstetricians, but this time there was nothing for de-
livery by birth attendants.” (Birth attendant, HD1)
Other respondents, particularly those from HD3, cited
past experiences of CSCOMs being awarded non-PBF-
related bonuses, such as the “Ciwara d’Or” (Golden
Ciwara). This prize was awarded by the USAID-funded
Kènèya Ciwara programme between 2003 and 2008 to
reward the best-performing CSCOMs. The quality indi-
cators from this Ciwara programme were used to de-
velop the list of quality indicators for the PBF project.
PBF was seen by most respondents (n = 123/161) as
an intervention that addressed what local actors consid-
ered to be ‘health priorities’. In particular, these included
increasing immunisation rates, prenatal consultations
(PNC), facility-based deliveries and family planning.
However, local personnel were not involved in designing
the project. This lack of involvement explained its poor
adaptation to the local context, since many respondents
(n = 86/161) perceived it as having been decided by the
World Bank, with no possibility for the actors involved
in its implementation to modify the choice of indicators.
“Often this demotivates us. Because if they say it’s
black, then it’s black. It can’t be changed. So, it
means we have no impact on that. So we have to live
with this.” (TDC, HD2)
Among the 10 indicators selected, ‘management of
mother-to-child transmission of HIV (PMTCT)’ and ‘tuber-
culosis management’ were considered to be of limited rele-
vance. The workers reported that they had not received
sufficient training in these areas and mentioned the limited
use of health facilities for these types of consultation.
Malnutrition, curative consultations for adults, geriat-
ric illnesses and childbirth attended by birth attendants
were perceived by many respondents (n = 123/161) as
relevant indicators. Yet, these were not included in the
list of selected indicators.
In some cases, health workers were no longer moti-
vated to strive for the centre’s good performance (as
intended by the purchase of these indicators) but rather
for personal financial gain. According to many respon-
dents (n = 83/161), the higher the associated payment,
the more relevant and motivating the indicator became:
“We’re more motivated by indicators that are well
paid than by indicators that are not well paid.”
(Nurse, HD1)
With few exceptions, PBF was perceived as a compli-
cated intervention to implement, partly because of data
management procedures. The number of working tools,
particularly forms and reports, contributed to this
complexity:
“With PBF, entering it in the register isn’t enough,
you have to write on the admission form, as re-
quired. It’s the reports and procedures that are a bit
complicated.” (Birth attendant, HD1)
Apart from the tools, the complexity of PBF also refers
to the sheer number and diversity of actors involved and
the distinctions to make between their different roles
(e.g. verification and control procedures).
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External context
Socio-normative framework and problems experienced
These are situations that are not directly related to PBF
but which are in a position to influence its results. Local
perceptions of pregnancy resulted in patients’ low at-
tendance at health centres:
“You call some women to come for PNC, they refuse.
They say pregnancy is shameful.” (Birth attendant,
HD1)
Problems experienced by patients and highlighted by
health workers were numerous. These included financial
difficulties, transportation problems, inadequate infor-
mation on the negative consequences of certain prac-
tices, deficiencies in patient intake and referral, and not
enough hospital rooms. Yet, PBF did not offer any solu-
tions to most of these problems.
The external context is also marked by what the actors
do and how they behave. This is the focus of the subsec-
tion below.
Networks of health workers
In the PBF project, the CSCOMs’ quantitative results
were audited by the district health team but, due to the
project’s limited duration, only one audit cycle could be
completed. This short time frame limited the possibility
of establishing a system of networks. On the other hand,
collaboration between CSCOMs and ASACOs, and be-
tween CSCOMs and their communes, was linked to
health decentralisation and has existed for a long time.
According to many respondents (n = 117/161), PBF im-
plementation fostered closer collaboration among these
three entities, which worked together to develop the
CSCOM’s quarterly results plan in the initial training.
“We validated the contract together, the objectives
were the percentages… We set all that with the staff
[of the CSCOM] and we tried to find out what the
population requires us to do per month; what we
can do. This based on each other's ideas, so as to es-
tablish the things that we validated together. And
we put that in the contract.” (TDC, HD1)
Quarterly results plans are documents that describe
the main obstacles to improving health indicators, the
solutions proposed to address them and the means
needed to implement those solutions. The quarterly re-
sults plans are drawn from the CSCOM’s annual micro
plan, which is a kind of business plan that identifies
trends in the quantitative and qualitative indicators to be
purchased and includes the CSCOM’s projected cash in-
flows and outflows to purchase these indicators. They
contain the technical elements of health planning
required to implement the agreements set out in the tri-
partite contract between the commune, the ASACO and
the CSCOM technical team.
The three entities (CSCOM, ASACO and commune)
also joined forces to conduct awareness-raising activities
in the villages. Additionally, the commune representative
was often invited to attend ASACO meetings, and vice
versa.
A competitive environment
PBF was perceived by most respondents (n = 92/161) as
establishing a logic of competition because the CSCOMs
and even the villages tended to compare one another in
terms of performance:
“When we talk about PBF, the competition becomes
tangible. So we need to really emphasise the compe-
tition among villages in the [health] area. Not only
among villages in the area, but also among the
CSCOMs. No one wants to come in last.” (TDC,
HD1)
Another respondent concurred, using a militaristic
idiom:
“It’s competition, that’s what it is. In any case, for us,
it’s a weapon of warfare.” (TDC, HD1)
PBF has been added to an already competitive envir-
onment. In the Mali setting, competition is justified by
pride in being recognised among the best. Competition
may materialise at the family, village, inter-village and
communal levels. Any economic activity can also be-
come a space for competition (agricultural production,
construction of development infrastructures, etc.).
This competitive logic was largely fuelled by the ex-
istence of projects such as the “Golden Ciwara” in
the past and the “Blue Star”, still in progress, whose
approaches greatly value the idea of competition
among CSCOMs. Besides the CSCOMs, communes
and health areas, this competition played out among
ASACOs and even HDs, engaged to improving access,
quality and use of high-impact health services as well
as household members’ adoption of good maternal
and child health practices.
According to many respondents (n = 89/161), this
competition impelled them to achieve greater efficiency:
“ … [if] there’s competition, everyone tries to save
their own heads… So people will make the effort.
You’ll find that there are things we don’t think of
doing, but as soon as they say this is how it has to
be, we’ll scramble to do it, you see.” (Community
leader, HD3)
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Concretely speaking, competition results in the fre-
quent introduction of incentives to motivate staff to stay
in their current workplace.
“The housing problem for our workers, if we could
get the money, we could build for them and they
wouldn’t go anywhere else. If there is competition, if
our work is well done, the CSCOM will be one of the
best.” (Cleaning staff, HD3)
Influence of public policies
The 2014–2018 Social and Health Development Pro-
gram (PRODESS III) referred to PBF, providing details
on its definition, benefits and functioning [15]. PBF was
also featured among the activities planned by the World
Bank’s SRHP as a means to strengthen the supply and
quality of reproductive health services by improving in-
dicators in this area. Thus, PBF is expected to contribute
to the achievement of a range of objectives of each of
these programmes as well as those of the 2014–2018
National Reproductive Health Strategic Plan.
Internal context
Information dissemination about PBF
TDCs and colleagues who had attended the initial train-
ing subsequently organised briefing sessions where they
shared information on PBF functioning with the other
workers who had remained on site. The briefings pro-
vided an opportunity to communicate the objectives
contained in the results plans. However, some respon-
dents, particularly the cleaning staff, felt that they had
simply been neglected and had not benefited from this
information sharing.
They felt that the briefings were validation sessions of
what the CSCOM representatives had already decided,
rather than real discussions: “It’s the leader doing this
and then informing us” (Birth attendant, HD1). In some
cases, the development of the performance contract ob-
jectives was largely dominated by the TDC, who in-
volved few other staff. The performance contracts set
out, on a quarterly basis, the commitments of the signa-
tory parties and the projected results. At the CSCOM
level, the contract was signed by the TDC, the chairman
of the ASACO, and the commune mayor.
During the meeting, information was given on PBF tools:
“The TDC brought us together. He had some files to
explain how the work on PBF could be done. The
part we should sign, we signed.” (Drug depot man-
ager, HD1).
In some cases, informal discussions with the TDC im-
proved staff’s sentiment of being better informed about
PBF.
Convergence between professional standards valued and
PBF- standards valued
PBF encourages the development of team spirit within
health teams. PBF is intended to ensure equity among
workers by paying each according to their performance.
The values and professional standards identified by the
majority of respondents (n = 97/161), are illustrated by
the following excerpts from interviews:
“It produces cohesion because we collaborate with
each other” (Commune member, HD3)
“When merit is rewarded, I think everyone will apply
themselves to quality. That’s it, really.” (Drug depot
manager, HD3)
“It will help us educate ourselves on the idea of work,
that is, being punctual, being present every day, giv-
ing ourselves autonomy in our work, and empower-
ing people.” (Midwife, HD1)
Forms of commitment to PBF
Commitment was expressed in the TDC’s efforts to in-
form other staff members of the importance of PBF:
“I remind the staff that they need to do their job
well, and I remind them of the importance of imple-
menting PBF.” (TDC, HD1)
Some ASACOs agreed to invest in infrastructure reno-
vations, while others made efforts to reinforce human
resources. Commitment was also reflected in regular
visits by the ASACO chairman or members to the
CSCOM to observe the progress of activities:
“If the [ASACO] chairman is seen here every morn-
ing, it’s because we’re respecting our commitments to
PBF.” (Vaccinator, HD2)
One respondent from HD1 noted that other ASACO
members were visiting the CSCOM much more regu-
larly since the launch of the intervention. Every staff
member had signed a personal commitment form. The
TDCs asked that this form be posted in front of the of-
fices so that everyone’s commitment would be visible. In
some cases, this commitment depended on the degree of
motivation. For example, for birth attendants who did
not receive premiums for deliveries, the commitment
had to be put into perspective:
“I myself am a birth attendant. What I’ve noticed, in
my view, in this new PBF, is that it’s birth atten-
dants who come last. That’s what I see.” (Birth at-
tendant, HD1)
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One respondent saw PBF as creating a situation of un-
fairness among workers, with the most qualified being
treated better than the others:
“No, they’re not rewarding everyone’s work, just those
who are qualified professionals.” (Community leader,
HD3)
The influence of local legacies
Participation in the first PBF project, as is the case in the
HD1, was used as a reason that justified the CSCOM’s
readiness to implement PBF:
“As long as there is this old system, the second system
cannot fail and can work well” (Member from the com-
mune, HD1). The majority of HD1 respondents (n = 43/
56) said that their centre was ready to implement the
new PBF project based on the fact that there was a sys-
tem put in place during the previous PBF that could well
contribute to its effectiveness: “The materials we had, we
can work with that” (Hygienist, HD1). In addition, some
CSCOMs had benefited from the interventions and sup-
port provided by NGOs such as Marie Stopes Inter-
national and Kèneya Ciwara through a CSCOM
accreditation programme as well as the AMCP ALIMA
with actions in the field of nutrition. According to sev-
eral respondents (n = 89/161), these legacies from the
past are an asset for the CSCOMs engaged in strength-
ening their equipment training and organisational
capacities:
“They have transferred skills and that is the main
thing. When skills are transferred, even if you leave,
the staff can work after you.” (TDC, HD3)
Characteristics of individuals
Those interviewed in the centres had been quite recep-
tive to the change proposed by PBF (n = 70/74). News of
the arrival of PBF generated enthusiasm. This positive
response often stemmed from their having heard about
the successful implementation of the first pilot project.
For many respondents (n = 89/161), the enthusiasm
expressed at the time of introduction dissipated due to
the lack of any PBF-specific supervision once the project
was under way. In some cases, the good practices gener-
ated by PBF, such as the introduction of attendance lists,
quickly disappeared:
“We were expecting supervision and then we're going
to give bonuses, but this hasn't been done so far,
which is why we have abandoned the attendance
book.” (Nurse, HD3)
Data analysis showed that a number of respondents
were unable to provide detailed information on certain
aspects of the PBF scheme, in particular relating to the
calculation of staff bonuses and the procedures for the
payment of bonuses and subsidies. Among the informa-
tion most mastered by the respondents were the objec-
tives of the intervention, with a focus on motivation and
payment according to the effort made. The information
on PBF was best mastered by the most qualified agents.
Most of the reasons given by respondents to explain
their positive attitudes towards PBF were based on their
perception that the initiative’s objectives incorporated
values they defended (work well done, merit rewarded,
consensus, cohesion, etc.):
“Because I've always said. It's so very much about re-
warding merit.” (TDC, HD3)
However, the conditions defined for financial incen-
tives were a source of frustration for some workers, es-
pecially for the less qualified, as noted above in the case
of birth attendants. Some respondents expressed a feel-
ing of relative satisfaction with PBF, while also showing
some form of concern:
“ … We were all happy and worried at the same
time, because it’s a new thing for us.” (TDC, HD3)
Implementation process
Within the PBF framework, the CSCOMs’ activities were
planned on a quarterly basis. The only intervention out-
come plans were developed during the initial training.
At the time of our data collection, CSCOM personnel
were focused more on making changes to maximise
their individual premiums. The schedules for the various
activities were rarely respected. Certain activities, such
as staff evaluations, could not be carried out in some
cases for lack of time. In fact, the initial time frame allot-
ted for project implementation (8 months) was reduced
to 6 months due to numerous problems (2012 political
crisis, recruitment of the implementing agency, manage-
ment problems, etc.). Initially, it was announced that
premiums would be paid on the basis of two working
quarters. In the end, workers received premiums for only
one quarter, with payment delays of up to 6 months in
some cases.
Despite the problems encountered by health teams,
significant changes appeared to have been made in sev-
eral areas. Schedules for outings in outreach strategies
(teams going to villages to conduct health activities)
were modified; in particular, the duration of outings was
increased. Some CSCOMs decided to strengthen the
vaccination team by recruiting again. This trend of
recruiting additional staff was not observed in CSCOMs
with low performance levels. To reduce the cost of pre-
scriptions for children, in accordance with a quality
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standard imposed by the PBF project, some ASACOs ne-
gotiated with health workers to encourage them to talk
with patients with a view to assessing their financial cap-
acity and then issuing prescriptions based on their situ-
ation. This was done so that premiums would not be
negatively affected due to non-compliance with this
standard. One of changes mentioned most often by re-
spondents with regard to the on-call system was that,
with the introduction PBF, skilled personnel (nurse,
nurse-obstetrician, midwife, TDC) became much more
present during childbirths than before. In accordance
with the new PBF instructions, when childbirth cases ar-
rived in the absence of skilled personnel during on-call
periods, the birth attendants called them to attend the
childbirths, unlike the pre-PBF period when they could
attend these deliveries on their own. For eligible staff,
the objective of such a measure was to earn more pre-
miums related to these deliveries.
Intake evolved from being ‘non-welcoming’ to showing
greater availability to patients. The measures taken in
the area of intake were verbal instructions given to
agents to welcome patients and changes in the reception
system. In most cases, both measures were introduced.
Some CSCOMs increased the number of consultation
rooms so as to avoid queues. Under PBF, the intake sys-
tem included referring patients to the services they
needed. In the CSCOMs classified as low-performing,
measures to improve intake more often took the form of
verbal instructions. Referral of patients to services that
meet their needs is a new initiative in many centres.
While the measure existed before PBF, it has been
strengthened with the implementation of the project.
In the area of hygiene, the PBF project compelled al-
most all the CSCOMs to adopt new rules on cleaning.
These rules refer to the quantity and quality of cleaning
carried out. They have made it possible to make changes
in the frequency of facility cleaning, in the number of
surfaces to clean and in the degree of cleanliness of the
spaces cleaned. Cleaning teams were also reinforced. Ac-
cording to most respondents (n = 126/161), the rate of
cleaning increased considerably:
“Cleaning is done every morning, first thing. Often
when the hygienist has finished the job, we do the
rest after the childbirth, and we also do the
cleanup.” (Nurse, HD1)
PBF also resulted in a better drug management system.
Drug depot managers regularly checked the stock to
avoid stock shortages. Ordering procedures were stream-
lined and orders were sent fairly quickly as soon as the
stock decreased. Monthly drug inventories were carried
out by the ASACOs and done regularly, according to the
depot managers. All drug depot managers (n = 12/12),
reported that they became more diligent in filling out
drug management tools
“Since the new PBF started, I fill out these docu-
ments every morning.” (Drug depot manager, HD1)
Inter-case comparisons summary
In this section, we offer a summary of the findings,
highlighting the similitudes and differences across the
different cases. The data revealed differences between
high-performing and low-performing CSCOMs in the
approach adopted for PBF implementation (Table 7).
These significant differences were seen in the ‘imple-
mentation climate’ and ‘readiness for implementation’
constructs related to the internal context (CFIR domain
3) and in the ‘engaging’ construct related to the imple-
mentation process (CFIR domain 5).
The best performing CSCOMs are characterised by a
better flow of information between the TDCs and the
rest of the team, a predominance of team spirit and
more initiatives to encourage the population to use ser-
vices (Table 7).
Analysis of the data also revealed similarities and dif-
ferences among HDs (Table 8). The specific features
refer to three of the five CFIR domains, namely internal
context, characteristics of individuals and implementa-
tion process.
Discussion
With the CFIR, which is increasingly being used in low-
and middle-income countries [39], we were able to con-
duct an in-depth contextual analysis, reflecting in par-
ticular on the internal and external contexts of the PBF
intervention. There is a recurrent conclusion in the lit-
erature that context has been neglected in research
aimed at developing and evaluating population health in-
terventions [40]. In sub-Saharan Africa, any analysis of
the implementation of public health interventions must
consider context [41]. The role of actors is also crucial
in the implementation and ownership process of a re-
form, where the pluralism of norms and their instability
often forces social actors to make multiple adjustments
[42]. Implementation may also be influenced by the fact
that the practical norms and professional cultures that
govern the actual behaviour of employees are far re-
moved from official norms. In addition, public goods
and services are co-provided by a series of different ac-
tors and institutions, with little coordination among
them – this feature may also shape implementation pro-
cesses [43].
In the context we studied, our attention was drawn to
certain constructs related to the internal context. The
differences between high-performing CSCOMs and low-
performing CSCOMs were highlighted when applying
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some constructs and sub-construct of this domain,
which also reflected attitudes and practices that were es-
pecially evident in the intervention start-up phase. These
were the construct of ‘implementation climate’ and the
sub-construct ‘leadership engagement’ (under the con-
struct ‘readiness for implementation’). In addition, our
analysis of the issue of leadership showed this to be a
factor that promoted good performance. As such,
CSCOMs led by a TDC with strong leadership achieved
more reforms in this PBF intervention. A study con-
ducted in Burkina Faso in district hospitals highlighted
that health centre managers’ leadership and vision were
essential ingredients for effective health action, particu-
larly in contextualising national strategies and taking pa-
tients’ concerns into account [44].
Our data underscore a strong link between leadership
and engagement. In the more successful CSCOMs, man-
agers’ commitment fostered staff commitment. In these
CSCOMs, the start-up phase of the intervention was
marked by multiple efforts from TDCs to explain to the
rest of the staff the importance of PBF in order to motiv-
ate them. Recent research has shown the importance of
leadership styles (directional or participatory) in deter-
mining health workers’ motivation for PBF in Mali [45].
PBF is an intervention that, like any other, requires
both individual and collective commitment on the part
of the actors involved. Individual commitment was the-
oretically manifested in each CSCOM employee’s signing
of a commitment form. Collective commitment was
expressed as a heightened spirit of initiative to improve
the chances of gaining more subsidies. This spirit of ini-
tiative was seen more often in the high-performing
CSCOMs than in the others, which performed poorly in
terms of the redesign of data collection tools, service or-
ganisation, measures to improve patient intake and bet-
ter hygiene.
The literature identifies several contextual factors that
could potentially explain the difference in performance
among facilities involved in PBF implementation [46–
48]. In particular, authors point to the uncertainty sur-
rounding the payment of premiums (e.g. late payment),
communication among stakeholders, confidence in the
performance measurement instrument methodology, the
health workers’ understanding of how PBF works and
the role of facility managers (management skills).
PBF can affect health workers’ motivation in a variety
of ways, and often in ways that extend far beyond the
direct effects of financial rewards for individuals [26].
One study in Nigeria showed that health workers’ motiv-
ation and performance were reduced by uncertainty
about obtaining the incentive and inadequate infrastruc-
ture [49]. Conversely, a good understanding of the sys-
tem among health workers and strong management
skills are likely to improve motivation and performance,
just as reducing delays in incentive payments, communi-
cating effectively and strengthening health workers’ un-
derstanding of the PBF system are likely to produce
better results in pay-for-performance programmes. An-
other study conducted in Sierra Leone found that imple-
mentation deficiencies, such as late payment and access
difficulties, posed a series of problems that limited the
motivational effects of incentives [50].
The analysis of our data showed the PBF project also
generated uncertainty and frustration among those
Table 7 Comparison of high- and low-performing CSCOMs by CFIR domains and constructs





Perception that the CSCOMs had prepared well for PBF
implementation
Staff of some CSCOMs reported that the conditions required






Objectives set out in the contract were, in many cases,
discussed before being ratified
The objectives were hardly discussed with the rest of the
staff
Results plans were seldom shared with the rest of the staff- Objectives and
feedback
Briefing sessions were used to communicate the





Awareness of being a single team in which each




TDCs explained the data on the importance of PBF to
the rest of the staff to motivate them




Process Engaging Many awareness-raising activities conducted by a team
consisting of the TDC, the commune mayor and the
ASACO chairman
TDCs led most of the awareness-raising sessions on their
own
ASACO Association de santé communautaire (community health association), CFIR Consolidated Framework for Implementation Research, CSCOM Community
health centre, PBF performance-based financing, TDC Technical Director of the Centre
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involved in its implementation. These had to do, among
other things, with the long delay in starting activities
and the lack of consideration for deliveries carried out
by birth attendants, particularly for those in HD1, who
had experience with the first pilot PBF project in which
these deliveries had been taken into account. These situ-
ations created a certain scepticism initially, even though
the majority of health workers expressed buy-in for the
intervention. In the interviews, the PBF remained an im-
portant source of motivation for the health workers.
Table 8 Summary of PBF implementation results in the three health districts according to the five CFIR domains






- PBF perceived as a foreign
intervention
NA
- Difficulty citing the name of
the funder
- Perceptions of a
complicated intervention
2. 1. 1. 1. 1.
External context
- Late recourse to care NA
- Insufficient vaccination
coverage of children




- Presence of NGOs that
could contribute to the
achievement of PBF
objectives
- Implementation of the
Social and Health
Development Program
3. 1. 1. 1.
Internal context
- Strong correlation between






First experience of involvement in
a PBF project
First experience of involvement in
a PBF project
- Personnel focused on
financial incentives









- Personnel receptive to
change
Arguments in favour of
PBF were based on the
success of the previous
PBF project
Arguments in favour of PBF were
based on the values attributed to
it and on rumours about the PBF
project
Arguments in favour of PBF were
based on the values attributed to
it and on rumours about the PBF
project- Perceived link between PBF
objectives and professional
values held by workers
5. 1. 1. 1. 1.
Implementation
process
- Schedule of planned
activities not respected
Greater proficiency with
PBF tools and content
Low proficiency with PBF tools
and content
Low proficiency with PBF tools
and content




- Increased presence of
skilled personnel during on-
call shifts
- Recruitment of new
personnel by some CSCOMs
CFIR Consolidated Framework for Implementation Research, CSCOM Community health centre, HD health district, NA not applicable, PBF
performance-based financing
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Their motivation was linked not only to subsidies but
also to improved working conditions (acquisition of
equipment, infrastructure) and better system governance
(rewarding merit). As such, PBF stimulated an inter-
active relationship between internal and external motiv-
ational factors related to responsibility, achievement and
recognition, thus increasing perceived motivation [51].
Some studies have strongly underscored the import-
ance of PBF-related motivation associated with work en-
vironments, including systematic supervision and
availability of essential drugs [23]. In Benin, a contextual
analysis of the implementation of two different PBF
models showed that, in this field, there is no rigid and
standardised model because each context dictates its
specific features [52]. Given the specificities of contexts
and characteristics, the ‘same’ project will be ‘different’
in each facility, i.e. some mechanisms may work in one
context and not in another, to the point where it be-
comes possible to identify features specific to each PBF
system [2].
It is important to note that PBF does not operate in a
vacuum within health systems. Some studies have under-
scored the complexity of these interventions, highlight-
ing the notion that an intervention can be seen as a
critical event in a system’s history, resulting in the emer-
gence of new structures of interaction and new shared
meanings [53]. The complexity of social interactions is a
property of both the intervention and the context [54].
Often, both CSCOM workers and the general population
perceived PBF as just another development project like
so many others they had seen over time, as noted re-
garding PBF in Burkina Faso [25]. In this context, pro-
jects come and go, but to the actors involved, they all
look the same [55]. Indeed, they are often implemented
in an environment that has undergone many previous
interventions that have left their traces. Such local his-
tory necessarily structures present behaviours, at least in
part [56]. This observation reflects the notion of ‘path
dependency’, in which each new reform is defined in ref-
erence (positive or negative) to a set of past policies [57].
The logic that generally prevails among project de-
signers is to consider the story as starting with their
own project, and then systematically underestimating
all that has been done before and overestimating their
project’s impact. PBF is no exception to this rule, as
the payment of performance-based premiums that is
at the heart of this intervention is a common prac-
tice. In the past, some projects also offered premiums
linked to health facilities’ overall performance. As a
public policy, PBF has been analysed at the national
level based on an accumulation of experiences in
which local actors have played a particularly import-
ant role as Ma-Nitu et al. [58] have suggested in
other African contexts.
The CFIR also enabled us to reflect on practices to en-
courage uptake of the intervention. PBF is anchored in
comprehensive standards for specific reforms – renewal
of public management structures, separation of functions
(buyers–providers), strengthened supervision, greater
autonomy of service providers and enhanced effective-
ness of information systems [59]. This research high-
lights how uptake is constructed through the interplay
of multiple actors. The qualitative approach allowed us
to go beyond the mechanical application of the CFIR
constructs and to give the analysis a less schematic char-
acter by showing, in a concrete way, how social actors
co-construct the reality of the implementation of PBF.
Indeed, analysing the results through the lens of the
CFIR domains and constructs, in particular domains 1
(characteristics of the intervention), 2 (internal context)
and 3 (external context), revealed useful information on
the ways in which local actors adapted PBF and shaped
it to their own logic. Such uptake occurs in a system of
norms and values that can influence the way it mani-
fests. We observed, for example, that the PBF implemen-
tation’s external context was marked by attitudes and
practices that could impede services use. An example of
this was the sense of shame associated with pregnancy
that prevented many women from going to the health
centre for PNC. Along these lines, some studies have
noted that the social context can directly affect the at-
tainment of PBF objectives if behaviours advocated by
this intervention are not socially or culturally anchored
[60]. Others have shown that how equity is conceived in
a given context can influence the acceptability of merito-
cratic payment systems [61].
Overall, certain ‘visible’ changes marked the launch of
the PBF project, notably the various changes made to
the on-call system, vaccination outings, patient intake
and hygiene. These reforms show that PBF implementa-
tion can have an impact on the health system, particu-
larly on service delivery, human resources and
governance [3].
Some studies have shown that giving specific informa-
tion to the community increases the effectiveness of par-
ticipation [62]. This information-sharing approach
corresponds to the theory of change centred on re-
sponsibility towards the community, as opposed to
the theory of change centred on responsibility to-
wards purchasers of services [2]. The case presented
in this study belongs to the latter theory of change,
notably because what the health workers primarily
retained from PBF was that they should receive pre-
miums and that these were linked to achieving per-
formance indicators. Their statements reflected the
fact that they had very little understanding of the
complexity of PBF functioning; a similar observation
was made in Burkina Faso [25].
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In demonstrating the influence of context on the im-
plementation of PBF through the inter-case comparative
approach, our research emphasised that, in a high per-
formance context, health facilities’ human resources are
better organised to implement PBF than in a low per-
formance context.
Due to subsequent delays in the implementation of the
pilot scheme and the very short time for implementa-
tion, the present research could only study the start-up
phase. This represents a limitation and long-term trends
are not known. At the same time, this situation empha-
sises the need to adapt the CFIR according to the stages
of a programme’s implementation (start-up, mid-term,
post-implementation) and more broadly to the context
of the study [39].
In addition, the results of our research contribute to a
better understanding of the prerequisites that must be in
place to support the achievement of the objectives iden-
tified in the results plans.
Conclusion
In this qualitative study, using the CFIR enabled to bet-
ter understand the process of implementing PBF based
on the CFIR’s five domains – (1) the characteristics of
the intervention, (2) the context external to the health
facilities, (3) the context internal to the health facilities,
(4) the characteristics of the individuals, and (5) the im-
plementation process. We have particularly emphasised
the role of the contextual specificities of the health facil-
ities. The external and internal contexts, in particular,
played a decisive role in the implementation process.
The leadership and commitment of the TDCs are much
more pronounced in the high-performing CSCOMs than
in the lower-performing CSCOMs. In addition, the most
significant differences between well-performing and less
performant CSCOMs are to be found in the internal
context (constructs ‘implementation climate’ and ‘readi-
ness for implementation’) and the implementation
process (under construct ‘engaging’). The study empha-
sised that the implementation of the PBF does not result
in a mechanical application of the official standards and
that these standards are always modulated according to
the context of implementation. Contexts indeed play a
determining role in implementation effectiveness.
The CFIR is a rich conceptual framework that makes
it possible to conduct a sufficiently detailed contextual
analysis, but whose dimensions are not always fully in
line with our own reflections. As we progressed through
our application of CFIR, we deliberately opted for an
‘open approach’, whereby we integrated notions that
seemed relevant for the analysis of some constructs,
without betraying their original definition. This back and
forth between original meaning and ‘extended’ meaning
makes the CFIR a suitable tool for analysing the imple-
mentation of an intervention.
Supplementary information




ASACO: Association de santé communautaire (community health
association); CFIR: Consolidated Framework for Implementation Research;
CSCOM: Centre de santé communautaire (community health centre);
CSREF: reference health centre; HD: health district; PNC: prenatal
consultation; PBF: performance-based financing; RHD: Regional Health
Department; SRHP: Strengthening Reproductive Health Project;
TDC: Technical Director of the Centre
Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank the Canadian Institutes of Health Research
(CIHR), Canadian Global Affairs and the International Development Research
Centre (IDRC) whose funds made this research possible through the
‘Innovating for Maternal and Child Health in Africa’ (IMCHA) initiative. We
also would like to thank the heads of the PBF project implementation
agency (CGIC) as well as the physicians in the HDs and all those interviewed
for the study who made themselves available and became involved in
ensuring the interviews went smoothly. Many thanks to the members of the
Project Coordination Unit (World Bank), who provided us with information
and documents concerning the project, Laurence Touré, Miseli's coordinator,
who supported the work of developing and adapting the interview guides,
and Heather Hickey for English language proofreading.
Authors’ contributions
VR drafted the research proposal with the collaboration of AC and LG. AC
supervised the data collection with TZ, LG and VR. LG trained AC, TZ and the
assistants in the use of the qualitative data analysis software. AC performed
Appendix
Table 9 Reasons for non-inclusion of certain constructs and sub-constructs
Constructs and sub-constructs Reasons for non-inclusion
Opinion leaders Opinion leaders, such as imams, politicians and presidents of women’s associations and youth associations,
were not involved in the implementation of the project
Leaders formally appointed for the
implementation
In the three districts, no community health centre (CSCOM) had formally appointed any agents for
performance-based financing implementation
Champions The implementation period was not long enough to allow for the emergence of champions
Reflection and evaluation In the start-up phase, no reflection or evaluation had yet been carried out
Evolution At the start of the intervention, no data was available to monitor whether the activities were progressing
according to the implementation plans
Coulibaly et al. Health Research Policy and Systems           (2020) 18:54 Page 15 of 17
the data analysis and wrote the article, which was reviewed and enriched by
LG, TZ and VR. All authors were involved in the study design, the
development of interview tools, and the literature review. The authors read
and approved the final manuscript.
Funding
This work was carried out as part of the programme ‘Results-based financing
and equity in Mali and Burkina Faso’. This is a research programme funded
through the ‘Innovating for Maternal and Child Health in Africa’ (IMCHA)
initiative, which is supported by the International Development Research
Centre (IDRC) in partnership with the Canadian Institutes of Health Research
and Global Affairs Canada. The funding agency played no role in the design
of the study, the collection and analysis of data, and the writing of the
manuscript. Please note that the funding provided by IDRC was for data
collection only and no funding was provided for articles and publication
charges.
Availability of data and materials
Not applicable.
Ethics approval and consent to participate
The research proposal was validated by the ethics committee of the National
Institute of Public Health Research (INRSP) of Mali (N°24/2015/CE-INRSP). Free




The authors declare they have no conflicts of interest.
Author details
1Miseli Research NGO, Bamako, Mali. 2Faculty of Medicine and
Odonto-Stomatology, Université des Sciences, des Techniques et des
Technologies, Bamako, Mali. 3UMI 3189 Environnement, Santé, Sociétés
(CNRS, UCAD, UGB, USTTB, CNRST), Dakar, Sénégal. 4Department of
Sociology, McGill University, Montreal, Canada. 5Department of Social and
Preventive Medicine, University of Montreal, Montreal, Canada. 6CEPED,
Institute for Research on Sustainable Development, IRD-Université de Paris,
ERL INSERM SAGESUD, Paris, France. 7École doctorale Pierre Louis de santé
publique: épidémiologie et sciences de l’information biomédicale, Université
de Paris, Paris, France.
Received: 20 July 2019 Accepted: 1 May 2020
References
1. Bertone MP, Falisse J-B, Russo G, Witter S. Context matters (but how and
why?). A hypothesis-led literature review of performance based financing in
fragile and conflict-affected health systems. PLoS ONE. 2018;13(4):e0195301.
2. Renmans D, Holvoet N, Criel B, Meessen B. Performance-based financing:
the same is different. Health Policy Plann. 2017;32:860–8.
3. Witter S, Toonen J, Meessen B, Kagubare J, Fritsche G, Vaughan K.
Performance-based financing as a health system reform: mapping the key
dimensions for monitoring and evaluation. BMC Health Serv Res. 2013;13:
367.
4. Gautier L, Tosun J, De Allegri M, Ridde V. How do diffusion entrepreneurs
spread policies? Insights from performance-based financing in sub-Saharan
Africa. World Development. 2018;110(C):160–75.
5. Basinga P, Gertler PJ, Binagwaho A, Soucat ALB, Sturdy J, Vermeersch CMJ.
Effect on maternal and child health services in Rwanda of payment to
primary health-care providers for performance: an impact evaluation.
Lancet. 2011;377:1421–8.
6. Bonfrer I, Van de Poel E, Van Doorslaer E. The effects of performance
incentives on the utilization and quality of maternal and child care in
Burundi. Soc Sci Med. 2014;123:96–104.
7. Steenland M, Robyn PJ, Compaore P, Kabore M, Tapsoba B, Zongo A, et al.
Performance-based financing to increase utilization of maternal health
services: evidence from Burkina Faso. SSM Popul Health. 2017;3:179–84.
8. Paul E, et al. Performance-based financing in low-income and middle-
income countries: isn’t it time for a rethink? BMJ Global Health. 2018;3(1):
e000664. https://doi.org/10.1136/bmjgh-2017-000664.
9. Ssengooba F, McPake B, Palmer N. Why performance-based contracting
failed in Uganda--an “open-box” evaluation of a complex health system
intervention. Soc Sci Med. 2012;75:377–83.
10. Chimhutu V, Songstad NG, Tjomsland M, Mrisho M, Moland KM. The
inescapable question of fairness in Pay-for-performance bonus distribution:
a qualitative study of health workers’ experiences in Tanzania. Global Health.
2016;12:77.
11. Milstein R, Schreyoegg J. Pay for performance in the inpatient sector: A
review of 34 P4P programs in 14 OECD countries. Health Policy. 2016;120:
1125–40.
12. Turcotte-Tremblay A-M, Spagnolo J, De Allegri M, Ridde V. Does
performance-based financing increase value for money in low- and middle-
income countries? A systematic review. Health Econ Rev. 2016;6:30.
13. Turcotte-Tremblay A-M, Gali-Gali IA, De Allegri M, Ridde V. The unintended
consequences of community verifications for performance-based financing
in Burkina Faso. Soc Sci Med. 2017;191:226–36.
14. Coulibaly A, Gautier L, Touré L, Ridde V. Le financement basé sur les
résultats (FBR) au Mali: peut-on parler d’émergence d’une politique
publique de santé? Int Develop Policy. 2020;12 12.1. https://doi.org/10.4000/
poldev.3242.
15. MSHP, MTASH, MPFEF. Ministère de la santé et de l’hygiène publique
(MSHP), Ministère du travail et des affaires sociales et humanitaires (MTASH),
Ministère de la promotion de la femme, de la famille et de l’enfant (MPFEF),
Programme de développement sanitaire et social (PRODESS) 2014-2018;
2013. http://www.sante.gov.ml/docs/PRODESS%20III%20Version%20finale.
pdf. Accessed 28 May 2020.
16. Gautier L, Coulibaly A, De Allegri M, Ridde V. From Amsterdam to Bamako: a
qualitative case study on diffusion entrepreneurs’ contribution to
performance-based financing propagation in Mali. Health Policy Plann. 2019;
34:656–66.
17. Seppey M, Ridde V, Touré L, Coulibaly A. Donor-funded project’s
sustainability assessment: a qualitative case study of a results-based
financing pilot in Koulikoro region, Mali. Global Health. 2017;13:86.
18. Anselmi L, Binyaruka P, Borghi J. Understanding causal pathways within
health systems policy evaluation through mediation analysis: an application
to payment for performance (P4P) in Tanzania. Implement Sci. 2017;12:10.
doi:https://doi.org/10.1186/s13012-016-0540-1.
19. Zitti T, Gautier L, Coulibaly A, Ridde V. Stakeholder perceptions and context
of the implementation of performance-based financing in district hospitals
in Mali. Int J Health Policy Manage. 2019;8:583–92.
20. Paul E, Sossouhounto N, Eclou DS. Local stakeholders’ perceptions about
the introduction of performance-based financing in benin: a case study in
two health districts. Int J Health Policy Manage. 2014;3:207–14.
21. Antony M, Bertone MP, Barthes O. Exploring implementation practices in
results-based financing: the case of the verification in Benin. BMC Health
Serv Res. 2017;17:204. https://doi.org/10.1186/s12913-017-2148-9.
22. Renmans D, Holvoet N, Orach CG, Criel B. Opening the “black box” of
performance-based financing in low- and lower middle-income countries: a
review of the literature. Health Policy Plann. 2016;31:1297–309.
23. Bhatnagar A, George AS. Motivating health workers up to a limit: partial
effects of performance-based financing on working environments in
Nigeria. Health Policy Plann. 2016;31:868–77.
24. Mayumana I, Borghi J, Anselmi L, Mamdani M, Lange S. Effects of payment
for performance on accountability mechanisms: evidence from Pwani,
Tanzania. Soc Sci Med. 2017;179:61–73.
25. Ridde V, Yaogo M, Zongo S, Somé P-A, Turcotte-Tremblay A-M. Twelve
months of implementation of health care performance-based financing in
Burkina Faso: a qualitative multiple case study. Int J Health Plann Manage.
2018;33:e153–67.
26. Bertone MP, Jacobs E, Toonen J, Akwataghibe N, Witter S. Performance-
based financing in three humanitarian settings: principles and pragmatism.
Conflict Health. 2018;12:28.
27. Luoto J, Shekelle PG, Maglione MA, Johnsen B, Perry T. Reporting of context
and implementation in studies of global health interventions: a pilot study.
Implement Sci. 2014;9:57.
28. Ministère de la Santé et de l’Hygiène Publique. Plan d'Action National de
Planification Familial du Mali 2014-2018. Bamako: Ministère de la Santé et
de l’Hygiène Publique; 2014. https://www.healthpolicyproject.com/ns/docs/
Coulibaly et al. Health Research Policy and Systems           (2020) 18:54 Page 16 of 17
Plan_d_Action_National_PF_du_Mali_2014_2018FINAL.pdf. Accessed 28
May 2020.
29. Raharison S, Waltensperger K Z, Guèye M, Dakono G, Camara MF. Étude
qualitative pour explorer les raisons de la faible utilisation des Services
Essentiels dans la Communauté (Mali), Rapport final. Bamako: Direction
nationale de la santé et de l’Hygiène publique; 2014.
30. Lachenal G. Le stade Dubaï de la santé publique. Revue Tiers Monde. 2013;
215:53–71.
31. Pfadenhauer LM, Gerhardus A, Mozygemba K, Lysdahl KB, Booth A,
Hofmann B, et al. Making sense of complexity in context and
implementation: the Context and Implementation of Complex Interventions
(CICI) framework. Implementation Sci. 2017;12:21. https://doi.org/10.1186/
s13012-017-0552-5.
32. Damschroder LJ, Aron DC, Keith RE, Kirsh SR, Alexander JA, Lowery JC.
Fostering implementation of health services research findings into practice:
a consolidated framework for advancing implementation science.
Implementation Sci. 2009;4:50.
33. Ilott I, Gerrish K, Booth A, Field B. Testing the Consolidated Framework for
Implementation Research on health care innovations from South Yorkshire.
J Eval Clin Pract. 2013;19:915–24.
34. Yin RK, Ridde V. 10. Théorie et pratiques des études de cas en évaluation de
programmes. In: Dagenais C, editor. Approches et pratiques en évaluation
de programmes. Montréal: Presses de l’Université de Montréal; 2018. p. 179–
98.
35. MISELI. Processus de sélection des sites de l’enquête dans le cadre du
programme de recherche « FBR et équité au Mali et au Burkina », note de
synthèse. Rapport de recherche. Bamako: MISELI; 2016.
36. Zombré D, Turcotte Tremblay AM, Sangaré A, Zongo S, Somé PA, Coulibaly
A, Touré L, Yaogo M, Ridde V. Méthode mixte et participative de sélection
d’études de cas multiples pour l’évaluation d’interventions de santé au
Burkina Faso et au Mali: de l’éthique à l’émique. http://
methodesmixtesfrancophonie.pbworks.com/w/file/fetch/109401628/
Zombr%C3%A9_et_al_ACFAS_MMIRA_2016.pdf. Accessed 14 Apr 2020.
37. Palinkas LA, Horwitz SM, Green CA, Wisdom JP, Duan N, Hoagwood K.
Purposeful sampling for qualitative data collection and analysis in mixed
method implementation research. Adm Policy Ment Health. 2015;42:533–44.
38. Saunders B, Sim J, Kingstone T, Baker S, Waterfield J, Bartlam B, et al.
Saturation in qualitative research: exploring its conceptualization and
operationalization. Qual Quant. 2018;52:1893–907.
39. Means AR, Kemp CG, Gwayi-Chore MC, et al. Evaluating and optimizing the
consolidated framework for implementation research (CFIR) for use in low-
and middle-income countries: a systematic review. Implement Sci. 2020;15:
17.
40. Shoveller J, Viehbeck S, Di Ruggiero E, Greyson D, Thomson K, Knight R. A
critical examination of representations of context within research on
population health interventions. Critical Public Health. 2016;26:487–500.
41. Ridde V, de Sardan J-PO. La mise en œuvre des interventions de santé
publique en Afrique : un thème stratégique négligé. Médecine et Santé
Tropicales. 2017;27:6–9.
42. Winter G. (dir.). Inégalités et politiques publiques en Afrique : pluralités des
normes et jeux d’ acteurs. Paris: Karthala; 2001.
43. Olivier de Sardan J-P, Ridde V. Public policies and health systems in Sahelian
Africa: theoretical context and empirical specificity. BMC Health Serv Res.
2015;15:S3.
44. Meda ZC, Konate L, Ouedraogo H, Sanou M, Hercot D, Sombie I. Leadership
and vision in the improvement of universal health care coverage in low-
income countries. Sante. 2011;21:178–84.
45. Fillol A, Lohmann J, Turcotte-Tremblay A-M, Somé P, Ridde V. The
importance of leadership and organizational capacity in shaping health
workers’ motivational reactions to performance-based financing: a multiple
case study in Burkina Faso. Int J Health Policy Manage. 2019;8(5):272–9.
46. Young GJ, White B, Burgess JF, Berlowitz D, Meterko M, Guldin MR, et al.
Conceptual issues in the design and implementation of pay-for-quality
programs. Am J Med Qual. 2005;20:144–50.
47. Canavan A, Swai G. Payment for Performance (P4P) Evaluation: 2008
Tanzania Country Report for Cordaid. Amsterdam: Royal Tropical Institute;
2008. http://www.bibalex.org/Search4Dev/files/305432/135295.pdf. Accessed
20 May 2020.
48. Toonen J, Canavan A, Vergeer P, Elovainio R. Learning lessons on
implementing performance based financing, from a multi-country
evaluation. Amsterdam: Royal Tropical Institute; 2009. https://www.who.int/
health_financing/documents/performance_based_financing_synthesis_
report.pdf. Accessed 16 Apr 2019.
49. Ogundeji YK, Jackson C, Sheldon T, Olubajo O, Ihebuzor N. Pay for
performance in Nigeria: the influence of context and implementation on
results. Health Policy Plann. 2016;31:955–63.
50. Bertone MP, Lagarde M, Witter S. Performance-based financing in the
context of the complex remuneration of health workers: findings from a
mixed-method study in rural Sierra Leone. BMC Health Serv Res. 2016;16:
286.
51. Gergen J, Rajkotia Y, Lohmann J, Ravishankar N. Performance-based
financing kick-starts motivational “feedback loop”: findings from a process
evaluation in Mozambique. Hum Resour Health. 2018;16:55. https://doi.org/
10.1186/s12960-018-0320-x.
52. Paul E, Lamine Dramé M, Kashala J-P, Ekambi Ndema A, Kounnou M, Aïssan
JC, et al. Performance-based financing to strengthen the health system in
Benin: challenging the mainstream approach. Int J Health Policy Manage.
2018;7:35–47.
53. Hawe P, Shiell A, Riley T. Theorising interventions as events in systems. Am J
Commun Psychol. 2009;43:267–76.
54. Hawe P. Lessons from complex interventions to improve health. Annu Rev
Public Health. 2015;36:307–23.
55. Crehan K, Oppen AV. Understandings of ‘development’: an arena of
struggle: the story of a development project in Zambia. Sociologia Ruralis.
1988;28:113–45.
56. Gentil D, Dufumier M, Macrae J. d’Asie et d’Amérique latine Groupe de
recherche pour l’amélioration des méthodes d’investigation en milieux
informels et ruraux d’Afrique. Le Suivi-évaluation dans les projets de
developpement rural: orientations méthodologiques. Paris: INSEE, groupe
Amira; 1984.
57. Palier B, Bonoli G. Phénomènes de Path Dependence et réformes des
systèmes de protection sociale. Revue Française de Science Politique. 1999;
49:399–420.
58. Mayaka Ma-Nitu S, Tembey L, Bigirimana E, Dossouvi CY, Basenya O, Mago
E, et al. Towards constructive rethinking of PBF: perspectives of
implementers in sub-Saharan Africa. BMJ Glob Health. 2018;3:e001036.
https://doi.org/10.1136/bmjgh-2018-001036.
59. Gautier L, De Allegri M, Ridde V. How is the discourse of performance-based
financing shaped at the global level? A poststructural analysis. Global
Health. 2019;15:6.
60. Olafsdottir AE, Mayumana I, Mashasi I, Njau I, Mamdani M, Patouillard E,
et al. Pay for performance: an analysis of the context of implementation in a
pilot project in Tanzania. BMC Health Serv Res. 2014;14:392.
61. Chimhutu V, Lindkvist I, Lange S. When incentives work too well: locally
implemented pay for performance (P4P) and adverse sanctions towards
home birth in Tanzania - a qualitative study. BMC Health Serv Res. 2014;14:
23.
62. Nyqvist MB, de Walque D, Svensson J. Information is Power: Experimental
Evidence on the Long-run Impact of Community Based Monitoring: The
World Bank; 2014. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/73981146
8318587268/Information-is-power-experimental-evidence-on-the-long-run-
impact-of-community-based-monitoring. Accessed 1 May 2019.
63. Means RA, Kemp GC, Gwayi-Chore MC, Gimbe S, Soi C, Sherr K, et al.
Evaluating and optimizing the consolidated framework for implementation
research (CFIR) for use in low- and middle-income countries: a systematic
review. Implementation Sci. 2020;15:17.
Publisher’s Note
Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in
published maps and institutional affiliations.
Coulibaly et al. Health Research Policy and Systems           (2020) 18:54 Page 17 of 17
